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1 Introduction
We consider the situation where the manager of a ﬁrm allocates several iden-
tical recruited workers to some departments such as sales, production, and so
on. Each department has an optimal number of workers, because if the de-
partment has fewer workers than the number, it cannot accomplish its task,
and if it has more, it needs extra equipment and incurs additional training
costs.
Since the optimal number of each department is unknown to the manager,
he/she has to make each department report its optimal number in order
to allocate the workers among them. On this occasion, the departments
may try to misrepresent their own optimal numbers: each department would
report the number which is more or less than his/her optimal number if
such misrepresentation leads to the allocation favorable to the department.
Hence, in order to attain a desirable allocation, the manager has to induce
the departments to reveal their true optimal numbers.
The above mentioned problem faced by the manager is an example of
the problem of allocating several units of an indivisible and identical ob-
ject among a ﬁnite group of agents with single-peaked, risk-averse, and von-
Neumann and Morgenstern utility functions. In this paper, we analyze the
problem axiomatically, which was initiated by Sasaki (1997).
One of the diﬃculties we face when we allocate the indivisible objects
is to obtain a fair allocation. For example, suppose that the manager has
to allocate three recruited workers to two departments, A and B. Further,
we assume that both departments have the same utility function and want
more than three workers, that is, their peaks are three. In the deterministic
environment the manager will allocate more workers to one department than
the other due to indivisibility. However, such allocation is not fair for the
departments. In order to deal with the diﬃculty due to indivisibility, not
deterministic rules but randomized rules, which associate with each proﬁle
of the utility functions a probability distribution on feasible allocations, are
considered. Randomization enables us to judge whether the allocation is fair
in the ex-ante sense. Ehlers and Klaus (2003) used the randomized version
of the axioms relating fariness such as symmetry, equal treatment of equals,
and no-envy in evaluating allocation rules.
In this paper, we introduce a new axiom relating to fairness, called equal
probability for the best. Given an agent and a probability distribution which
the randomized rule outputs, let us call the number of the object which gives
him/her the highest utility with a strictly positive probability the best for
the agent. Then, equal probability for the best requires the randomized rules
to output the probability distribution which has the following marginal dis-
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tribution: if two agents have the same utility function, then they should get
the same best with the same probability. In the same example in the previous
paragraph, let us consider the case in which a randomized rule outputs a
probability distribution which gives department A the marginal distribution
that places probability zero on getting three workers, and probability 1/3 on
getting two, one, and no worker(s) respectively. We can say that getting two
workers is the best for department A in this case. Then, this axiom requires
that the probability distribution should give department B the marginal dis-
tribution where getting two workers is the best for it and is placed probability
1/3 on. However, the probability placed on getting one worker and that on
getting no worker do not need to be equal between the departments.
The contributions of this paper are as follows. First, our paper shows
that in the presence of Pareto optimality, equal probability for the best,
equal treatment of equals, and symmetry are equivalent. Equal treatment of
equals says that if two departments’ utility functions are same, their expected
utilities should also be same. Symmetry says that if two departments’ utility
functions are same, their marginal distributions should be same. Note that
equal probability for the best is logically independent to equal treatment of
equals. Equal probability for the best is the ﬁrst axiom that is indigenous
to indivisibility or randomization. The axioms used in previous papers on
probabilistic allocation of the indivisible objects, such as equal treatment
of equals, symmetry, and so on, are just the randomized version of those
used in the deterministic environment. However, equal probability for the
best has no counterpart in the deterministic environment. In addition, equal
probability for the best is a weak axiom in the sense that it requires that only
a part of the marginal distribution should be equal between the departments
with the same utility function, whereas some other axioms require the whole
part should be.
Second, using the result of Ehlers and Klaus’ (2003), we can characterize
the randomized uniform rule, which is a well-known randomized rule, by
strategy-proofness, Pareto optimality, and equal probability for the best. Our
result is an alternative characterization of the randomized uniform rule. An
advantage of the result is using the axiom that is indigenous to randomization
in order to characterize the randomized version of the uniform rule.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model. Several
axioms are presented in Section 3. Our theorems are presented in Section 4.
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2 The Model
We consider the problem of allocating several units X ∈ Z++ of an indivisible
object among a ﬁnite group of agents, N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The objects are
identical. We denote the set of the indivisible objects by C = {0, 1, 2, . . . , X}.
Each agent i ∈ N has a von-Neumann and Morgenstern utility function
ui : C → R which is single-peaked and risk-averse. ui is single-peaked if there
is a unique peak p(ui) ∈ C such that for all k, k′ ∈ C with p(ui) ≤ k < k′
or k′ < k ≤ p(ui), ui(p(ui)) ≥ ui(k) > ui(k′). ui is risk-averse if for any
k ∈ C\{0, X}, ui(k) − ui(k − 1) > ui(k + 1) − ui(k). We assume that the
utility functions are only privately known. Let U be the set of all single-
peaked, risk-averse, and von-Neumann and Morgenstern utility functions.
u = (u1, u2, . . . , un) ∈ Un is called a proﬁle of the utility functions. u−i
stands for (u1, . . . , ui−1, ui+1, . . . , un) ∈ Un−1.
(N, u,X) is called a problem. We say that the problem is in excess de-
mand if
∑
i∈N p(ui) ≥ X. If
∑
i∈N p(ui) < X, the problem is in excess supply.
A feasible allocation is a vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ Cn with
∑
i∈N xi = X.
Free-disposability is not allowed. Let A(X) be the set of all feasible alloca-
tions. f is a probability distribution on A(X) such that f : A(X) → [0, 1]
and
∑
x∈A(X) f(x) = 1. Let S(X) be the set of all probability distributions
on A(X). A randomized rule is a function φ : Un → S(X). We deﬁne
the probability with which a probability distribution f gives k units of the
indivisible object to agent i by fi(k) ≡
∑
x∈{x∈A(X )|xi=k} f(x). This means
that fi is the marginal distribution of f with respect to the number of the
object that the agent i obtains. As demonstrated in Example 3 by Ehlers
and Klaus (2003), two distinct probability distributions may have the same
marginal distribution.
Given a probability distribution f , we call
∑
k∈C fi(k)ui(k) the expected
utility of agent i. We abuse notation, and write φ(u)(x) as φ(x; u) and
φi(u)(k) as φi(k; u). φ(x; u) is the probability which the randomized rule φ
places on the feasible allocation x ∈ A(X) when the reported utility proﬁle
is u ∈ Un. φi(k; u) is the probability with which agent i obtains k units of
the object under the randomized rule φ when the reported utility proﬁle is
u.
3 Axioms
We are interested in the following axioms. The ﬁrst is related to fairness.
We call it equal probability for the best. Given a probability distribution
and an agent, there exists a number of the object which gives him/her the
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highest utility with a strictly positive probability. The number is called the
best. It should be noted that since every utility function is single-peaked the
agent has at most two bests: one is on the left side of his/her peak and the
other is on the right side. Also note that each agent has only one best if the
randomized rule satisﬁes same-sidedness.
Then, equal probability for the best requires the randomized rule to out-
put the probability distribution which has the following marginal distribu-
tion: if two agents have the same utility function, then at least one of the
bests and the corresponding probabilities should be same between the agents.
Note that the marginal distribution of each agent does not need to be same
between the agents.
In order to deﬁne equal probability for the best formally, for any i ∈ N
and any f ∈ S(X), we need Bif : the set of all pairs consisting of both the
number of the object which gives agent i the highest utility with a strictly
positive probability and the corresponding probability of the number under
the probability distribution f . Note that Bif is a singleton or a doubleton.
For any probability distribution f ∈ S(X), any i ∈ N , and any ui ∈ U , let
Bif ≡ {(b, fi(b)) ∈ C × (0, 1] | ui(b) ≥ ui(k) for all k ∈ C such that fi(k) >
0}.
Using Bif , equal probability for the best can be represented as follows.
Equal probability for the best. For any u ∈ Un and any i, j ∈ N , if
ui = uj, then B
i
φ(u) ∩Bjφ(u) = ∅.
Equal treatment of equals says that if two agents’ utility functions are same,
their expected utilities should also be same.
Equal treatment of equals. For any u ∈ Un and any i, j ∈ N , if ui = uj,
then
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)ui(k) =
∑
k∈C φj(k; u)uj(k).
Other axiom relating to fairness is symmetry.
Symmetry. For any u ∈ Un and any i, j ∈ N , if ui = uj, then φi(k; u) =
φj(k; u) for all k ∈ C .
Remark 1. Both equal probability for the best and equal treatment of
equals are implied by symmetry. It is easy to check that equal probability
for the best and equal treatment of equals are logically independent.
A standard axiom that needs no further explanation is Pareto optimality.
Pareto optimality. For any u ∈ Un, there is no f ∈ S(X) such that
for all i ∈ N , ∑k∈C fi(k)ui(k) ≥
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)ui(k) and for some j ∈ N ,∑
k∈C fj(k)uj(k) >
∑
k∈C φj(k; u)uj(k).
Pareto optimality implies same-sidedness, which requires that for any agent
every number of the object which he/she obtains with a strictly positive
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probability should be equal to or less (more) than his/her own peak when
the problem is in excess demand (supply).
Same-sidedness. For any u ∈ Un and any i ∈ N ,
(i) when
∑
j∈N p(uj) ≥ X, for all k ∈ C, φi(k; u) > 0 implies k ≤ p(ui), and
(ii) when
∑
j∈N p(uj) < X, for all k ∈ C, φi(k; u) > 0 implies k ≥ p(ui).
Lemma 1 (Sasaki (1997)). If φ is Pareto optimal, then it is same-sided.
Proof of Lemma 1. See Sasaki (1997). 
For the converse statement of Lemma 1 to be true we need property B, which
is shown as Lemma 3 in Appendix.
The ﬁnal is the requirement that no agent ever beneﬁts from misrepresenting
his/her utility function.
Strategy-proofness. For any i ∈ N , any ui, uˆi ∈ U , and any u−i ∈ Un−1,∑
k∈C φi(k; u)ui(k) ≥
∑
k∈C φi(k; uˆi, u−i)ui(k).
4 The Results
We have the following results on equal probability for the best.
Theorem 1. In the presence of Pareto optimality, the following three axioms,
equal probability for the best, equal treatment of equals, and symmetry are
equivalent.
Before proceeding to prove Theorem 1, we need the following lemma. Lemma
2 says that Pareto optimality implies property B, which requires that ran-
domized rules assign the probability distribution where each agent receives
at most two numbers of the object which are adjacent with each other.
Property B (Sasaki (1997)). For any u ∈ Un and any i ∈ N , there exists
αi ∈ C with φi(αi + 1;u) > 0 such that φi(αi; u) + φi(αi + 1;u) = 1.
Lemma 2 (Sasaki (1997)). If φ satisfies Pareto optimality, then it satisfies
property B.
Proof of Lemma 2 is in Appendix.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let φ be a randomized rule satisfying Pareto optimality.
Fix u ∈ Un and consider the case when ∑i∈N p(ui) ≥ X. The other case is
similar. From Lemmas 1 and 2 φ satisﬁes same-sidedness and property B. By
property B, for any agent i ∈ N , there exists αi ∈ C with φi(αi + 1;u) > 0
such that φi(αi; u)+φi(αi+1;u) = 1. From same-sidedness, we have p(ui) ≥
αi + 1 > αi for all i ∈ N . Hence, for any agent i the best for him/her is
αi + 1.
Suppose that φ satisﬁes equal probability for the best. Pick any agent
i, j ∈ N such that ui = uj. Then, from equal probability for the best, we
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have Biφ(u)∩Bjφ(u) = ∅. From the previous paragraph, we have Biφ(u) = {(αi+
1, φi(αi +1;u))} for any i ∈ N . Therefore, Biφ(u) ∩Bjφ(u) = ∅ gives us that for
any i, j ∈ N,αi = αj, φi(αi; u) = φj(αj; u), and φi(αi + 1;u) = φj(αj + 1;u).
Hence, from property B it is clear that φi(k; u) = φj(k; u) for all k ∈ C ,
which means that φ satisﬁes symmetry. It is obvious that symmetry implies
equal treatment of equals.
Next, suppose that φ satisﬁes equal treatment of equals. Pick any agent
i, j ∈ N such that ui = uj. Then, we have
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)ui(k) =
∑
k∈C φj(k; u)uj(k).
From the ﬁrst paragraph, we have
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k = φi(αi; u)αi + φi(αi +
1;u)(αi + 1) = φj(αj; u)αj + φj(αj + 1;u)(αj + 1) =
∑
k∈C φj(k; u)k. Same-
sidedness implies that p(ui) ≥ αi + 1 > αi for all i ∈ N . Therefore, we have
αi = αj and φi(αi + 1;u) = φj(αj + 1;u). Since αi + 1 and αj + 1 are the
best for agent i and j respectively, we have Biφ(u) = {(αi + 1, φi(αi + 1;u))}
and Bjφ(u) = {(αj + 1, φj(αj + 1;u))}, which implies that φ satisﬁes equal
probability for the best. 
Remark 2. Only in the presence of property B, symmetry is not equivalent
to equal probability for the best.
The main feature of Theorem 1 is that we clarify the relation of our axiom,
equal probability for the best to other axioms relating to fairness. Our axiom
is indigenous to indivisibility or randomization so that it has no counterpart
in the deterministic environment. On the other hand, in previous papers
on randomization of the uniform rule, all axioms on fairness, such as equal
treatment of equals, symmetry, and so on, are just the randomized version
of those used in the deterministic environment.
Ehlers and Klaus (2003) showed that the class of the randomized uni-
form rules is characterized by equal treatment of equals, Pareto optimality,
and strategy-proofness. Hence, using Theorem 1, the randomized uniform
rule can be characterized by strategy-proofness, Pareto optimality, and equal
probability for the best. The randomized uniform rule is a randomized ex-
tension of the uniform rule.1
Definition 1. The randomized uniform rule Φ : Un → S(X) is the function
deﬁned as follows: for any u ∈ Un,
(i) when
∑
i∈N p(ui) ≥ X,


Φj(p(uj); u) = 1 if p(uj) ≤ λ,
Φj(µ + 1;u) = λ− µ
Φj(µ;u) = 1− (λ− µ) if p(uj) > λ,
1See Benassy (1982) for the uniform rule.
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(ii) when
∑
i∈N p(ui) < X,


Φj(p(uj); u) = 1 if p(uj) ≥ λ,
Φj(µ + 1;u) = λ− µ
Φj(µ;u) = 1− (λ− µ) if p(uj) < λ,
for all j ∈ N , where λ ∈ R+ solves
∑
i∈N
∑
k∈C Φi(k)k = X and µ ≡ 	λ
.23
The randomized uniform rule associates with each proﬁle of the utility func-
tions a probability distribution that induces the marginal distribution of the
following form. When the problem is in excess demand (supply), the agent
whose peak is equal to or less (more) than a common bound λ gets his/her
own peak with probability 1. The rest of the agents get µ+1 with probability
λ− µ and µ with probability 1 − λ + µ respectively. µ is obtained through
rounding down the common bound λ.
Theorem 2. The randomized uniform rule Φ is the only randomized rule
satisfying strategy-proofness, Pareto optimality, and equal probability for the
best.
An advantage of Theorem 2 is using the axiom that is indigenous to random-
ization when we characterize the randomized version of the uniform rule.
2For any a ∈ R, let 	a
 = n be the integer such that n ≤ a < n+ 1.
3The randomized uniform rule outputs “a” probability distribution which induces each
agent’s marginal distribution defined as (i) and (ii) of Definition 1. Hence, the randomized
uniform rule uniquely determines a marginal distribution for each agent, but it does not
uniquely determine a probability distribution (although it uniquely chooses a probability
distribution) because more than one probability distribution can have an identical marginal
distribution.
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Appendix
Lemma 3. If φ satisﬁes same-sidedness and property B, then it satisﬁes
Pareto optimality.
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose the contrary. There exists f ∈ S(X) such
that for all i ∈ N , ∑k∈C fi(k)ui(k) ≥
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)ui(k) and for some j ∈
N ,
∑
k∈C fj(k)uj(k) >
∑
k∈C φj(k; u)uj(k). Without loss of generality, we
assume that
∑
i∈N p(ui) ≥ X. Let λi ≡
∑
k∈C fi(k)k and µi ≡ 	λi
 for all
i ∈ N . From risk-averseness, we have for all i ∈ N , (1 − λi + µi)ui(µi) +
(λi − µi)ui(µi +1) ≥
∑
k∈C fi(k)ui(k). From property B, for all i ∈ N , there
exists αi ∈ C such that φi(αi; u) + φi(αi + 1;u) = 1. Therefore, we have∑
k∈C φi(k; u)ui(k) = φi(αi; u)ui(αi) + φi(αi + 1;u)ui(αi + 1) for all i ∈ N .
Hence, we have (1 − λi + µi)ui(µi) + (λi − µi)ui(µi + 1) ≥ φi(αi; u)ui(αi) +
φi(αi+1;u)ui(αi+1) for all i = j and (1−λj+µj)uj(µj)+(λj−µj)uj(µj+1) >
φj(αj; u)uj(αj) + φj(αj + 1;u)uj(αj + 1).
From same-sidedness, we have for all i ∈ N , p(ui) ≥
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k.
Hence, single-peakedness implies that for all i = j, (1 − λi + µi)µi + (λi −
µi)(µi + 1) ≥ φi(αi; u)αi + φi(αi + 1;u)(αi + 1) and (1− λj + µj)µj + (λj −
µj)(µj + 1) > φj(αj; u)αj + φj(αj + 1;u)(αj + 1).
Summing up gives us
∑
i∈N(1 − λi + µi)µi +
∑
i∈N(λi − µi)(µi + 1) >∑
i∈N φi(αi; u)αi +
∑
i∈N φi(αi + 1;u)(αi + 1). The left hand side becomes∑
i∈N λi =
∑
i∈N
∑
k∈C fi(k)k = X. The last equality follows from feasibility.
Moreover, the right hand side also becomes
∑
i∈N
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k = X by
feasibility. This is a contradiction. 
Proof of Lemma 2 (Sasaki (1997)). Suppose the contrary. Then, there exist
a, b, c ∈ C such that φi(a; u) > 0, φi(c; u) > 0 and a < b < c. Then,
there exist x′ and x′′ ∈ A(X) such that x′i = a, x′′i = c, φ(x′; u) > 0 and
φ(x′′; u) > 0. Without loss of generality, we assume that φ(x′; u) ≥ φ(x′′; u).∑
l∈N x
′
l =
∑
l∈N x
′′
l = X and a < c imply that there exists j = i such that
x′j > x
′′
j . Let us deﬁne x˜ and xˆ ∈ A(X) as

x˜i = a + 1,
x˜j = x
′
j − 1,
x˜l = x
′
l for all l = i, j,
and


xˆi = c − 1,
xˆj = x
′′
j + 1,
xˆl = x
′′
l for all l = i, j.
Let us deﬁne f ∈ S(X) as


f(x′) = φ(x′; u)− φ(x′′; u),
f(x′′) = 0,
f(x˜) = φ(x˜; u) + φ(x′′; u),
f(xˆ) = φ(xˆ; u) + φ(x′′; u),
f(y) = φ(y; u) for all y = x′, x′′, x˜, xˆ.
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Note that if x˜ = xˆ, then let us deﬁne f(x˜) = f(xˆ) ≡ φ(xˆ; u) + 2φ(x′′; u).
Then, by risk-averseness, we ﬁnd that
∑
k∈C fi(k)ui(k) >
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)ui(k),∑
k∈C fj(k)uj(k) ≥
∑
k∈C φj(k; u)uj(k) and
∑
k∈C fl(k)ul(k) =
∑
k∈C φl(k; u)ul(k)
for all l = i, j. This contradicts Pareto optimality of φ. 
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